Using Lispex Vouch

Before you start

Prepare these independently:

the reviewed rule as refund-window.lspx.png or refund-window.lspx;
the exact checked input file INPUT;
an Ed25519 public key issuer.spki.der and an absolute local PKCS#8 key URI;
the reviewed digest of the exact Native executable; and
new paths for POLICY, OUTPUT, and each report.

The trust policy belongs to the consumer. Do not derive trust from the bundle you are about to verify.

The six-stage path

Stage	Main command	What a success establishes	Surface
1. Describe trust	`vouch policy create`, then `policy check`	exact canonical configuration for reviewed key, engine, and source identities	Native or npm
2. Issue	`vouch issue --emit-bundle`	a Native-signed exact source/input/profile context and bounded transport bundle	Native only
3. Authenticate	`vouch verify --bundle ...`	the bundle-owned signed context satisfies the supplied policy	Native or npm
4. Bind the request	add `--source-image` (or `--source`) and `--input`	the authenticated context equals this invocation’s separately supplied request	Native or npm
5. Observe current execution	add `--reexecute`	the current Native verifier agrees with the signed complete transcripts	Native only
6. Require one decision	`vouch gate --require-decision ...`	this live authenticated Native agreement matches the caller’s required decision	Native only

Read the results in order

A valid policy is configuration, not authentication.
Unpinned bundle verification authenticates bundle-owned context only.
Pinned verification adds exact equality with the caller’s external source and input; both files are mandatory for authority-bearing Native steps.
Re-execution is a new current Native observation, not a claim about a past run or an independent implementation.
A gate exit of 0 is one local decision match. Exit 10 means no grant. The report itself cannot be replayed as a grant.
Any payment, deployment, refund, or other action remains a separate application decision with its own freshness and replay controls.

Assurance levels

Operation	Establishes	Still requires
Identity commands	`key-id`, `engine-id`, `source-id`, and `input-id` print exact existing values from named bounded files through shared Rust	no stdin, artifact inference, provenance, trust, input validation, authentication, evidence, or authority
Policy create/check	`lispex vouch policy create` writes one canonical v1 policy from reviewed public inputs; `policy check` validates exact canonical bytes	no private key, inferred engine, artifact trust, overwrite/merge, authentication, evidence, decision grant, or browser export
Source ID	`lispex vouch source-id --source RULE` prints the exact policy v1 value from bounded bytes	no stdin, artifact extraction, normalization, approval, policy writing, authentication, or evidence
Trust policy v1	key-local exact `allowed_source_sha256` after signature/profile/engine checks	`native-source-disallowed` before raw source mismatch; no input/request or freshness policy
Bundle	one bounded transport input for exact envelope/source/input bytes	external trust/profile plus authentication; transport alone establishes no authority
Inspect	schema, hashes, and structural consistency	origin authentication
Authenticate	an authorized key signed the exact bound envelope context	a current execution observation
Re-execute	the current Native verifier agrees with both signed complete transcripts	application authorization and policy review
Compiled artifact build/validate	canonical Core IR and verified bytecode are exactly re-derived from the separately supplied source	authentication, execution, compiler correctness outside this derivation, or authority
Compiled re-execute	authenticated current tree/Meaning and the verified Rust VM all agree with the signed complete transcript	independent implementation equivalence, freshness, policy correctness, or external authorization
Gate	live authenticated current-Native agreement exactly matches the explicitly required decision	freshness, replay handling, identity, policy review, and deployment controls
Act	a separate application action outside Vouch	application-owned authorization and side-effect controls

Commands you can copy

1. Derive the exact key identity

lispex vouch key-id --public-key issuer.spki.der

2. Derive the exact engine identity

lispex vouch engine-id --executable /exact/path/to/lispex

3. Derive the exact source identity

lispex vouch source-id --source-image refund-window.lspx.png

4. Derive the exact input identity

lispex vouch input-id --input INPUT

5. Native issue and emit the bundle

lispex vouch issue \
  --source-image refund-window.lspx.png --input INPUT \
  --profile csk.checked-profile/v1 \
  --key-handle pkcs8-file:///ABSOLUTE/issuer.pk8 \
  --out-dir OUTPUT --emit-bundle

6. Create policy from independently reviewed public inputs

lispex vouch policy create \
  --public-key issuer.spki.der \
  --engine-sha256 sha256:<reviewed-engine-digest> \
  --source-image refund-window.lspx.png --out POLICY

7. Check the exact canonical policy bytes

lispex vouch policy check --trust-policy POLICY

8. Native or npm authenticate the bundle-owned context

lispex vouch verify \
  --bundle OUTPUT/vouch-input-bundle.json \
  --trust-policy POLICY --profile csk.checked-profile/v1 \
  --report-out AUTH-REPORT

9. Native or npm pin the bundle to the intended request

lispex vouch verify \
  --bundle OUTPUT/vouch-input-bundle.json \
  --trust-policy POLICY --source-image refund-window.lspx.png --input INPUT \
  --profile csk.checked-profile/v1 --report-out PINNED-REPORT

10. Native bind the exact request and re-execute

lispex vouch verify \
  --bundle OUTPUT/vouch-input-bundle.json \
  --trust-policy POLICY --source-image refund-window.lspx.png --input INPUT \
  --profile csk.checked-profile/v1 --reexecute \
  --report-out REEXECUTION-REPORT

11. Native local decision gate

lispex vouch gate \
  --bundle OUTPUT/vouch-input-bundle.json \
  --trust-policy POLICY --source-image refund-window.lspx.png --input INPUT \
  --profile csk.checked-profile/v1 --require-decision approve \
  --report-out GATE-REPORT

12. Optionally require verified VM agreement

Build the Vouch-specific compiled container from the same exact source. This does not authenticate, execute, or grant anything:

lispex vouch compiled build \
  --source-image refund-window.lspx.png \
  --out refund-window.lpxvca

lispex vouch compiled inspect \
  --artifact refund-window.lpxvca

lispex vouch compiled validate \
  --artifact refund-window.lpxvca \
  --source-image refund-window.lspx.png

Then opt into the compiled path without removing any earlier pin or check:

lispex vouch verify \
  --bundle OUTPUT/vouch-input-bundle.json \
  --trust-policy POLICY --source-image refund-window.lspx.png --input INPUT \
  --profile csk.checked-profile/v1 --reexecute \
  --compiled-artifact refund-window.lpxvca \
  --report-out COMPILED-REEXECUTION-REPORT

lispex vouch gate \
  --bundle OUTPUT/vouch-input-bundle.json \
  --trust-policy POLICY --source-image refund-window.lspx.png --input INPUT \
  --profile csk.checked-profile/v1 --require-decision approve \
  --compiled-artifact refund-window.lpxvca \
  --report-out COMPILED-GATE-REPORT

The container must be canonical, pass the strict bytecode verifier, and match an exact source-to-Core-IR-to-bytecode derivation before VM state exists. The current tree/Meaning execution must still agree first. A producer mutation, different source byte, VM disagreement, or required-decision mismatch fails closed; the command never retries through the source-only gate.

13. Raw compatibility with the same policy

lispex vouch verify \
  --envelope OUTPUT/envelope.dsse.json \
  --trust-policy POLICY --source-image refund-window.lspx.png --input INPUT \
  --profile csk.checked-profile/v1 --report-out AUTH-REPORT

A common mistake

The gate does not execute an external action and its report is not a transferable authorization. The calling application still owns freshness, replay handling, identity, deployment controls, and whether requiring that decision is safe and correct.

Current boundaries

Policy creation never accepts a private key, stdin, envelope, bundle, receipt, report, inferred running engine, network resource, or existing policy to merge. Public-key provenance, engine/source review, policy distribution, replacement, and lifecycle remain consumer-owned; browser WASM and Playground expose no policy API.
Identity commands accept named files only and infer nothing from artifacts. source-id and input-id are domain-separated rather than ordinary SHA-256; neither decodes or normalizes text, and input-id does not parse checked-input JSON. No identity establishes provenance, approval, policy, trust, authentication, evidence, freshness, replay control, or authority.
A bundle is untrusted transport, not a receipt, signature, report, capability, source approval, or transferable authorization. It adds no encryption or confidentiality; freshness, nonce enforcement, expiry, revocation, replay prevention, identity, independent witnessing, policy correctness, provenance before the supplied bytes, deployment safety, or permission for an external action.
Request pinning is exact equality, not freshness, nonce uniqueness, expiry, revocation, replay prevention, human intent, or permission for an external action. An invalid signature or policy is rejected before a request mismatch is reported. --source and --input must be supplied together with a bundle; a partial pair is usage exit 2 before artifact I/O.
A compiled artifact is deterministic integrity material derived from exact source, not a trust root, signed request, independent witness, or portable capability. Its report cannot be used as evidence input. The compiled path does not establish organizational identity, policy or rule correctness, freshness, replay prevention, compiler correctness beyond the checked derivation, or permission for an external action.

Keep going

Keep the Vouch overview nearby: it separates authentication, request binding, current execution agreement, and a local grant.

Lispex Vouch overview · Choosing a Runtime Surface