The receipt at the center
A native differential receipt (csk.differential-receipt/v0) is the
record of one checked decision run. It binds the declared checked rule, the
input context, the lowering and evaluation observations, the connecting
hashes, and the contract version. “Differential” means the receipt records
the same rule executed twice — on the ordinary tree evaluator and through the
lowered Meaning path — so later checks can compare the two transcripts.
Which command checks or emits which artifact
- Structural inspection validates schema and recomputable byte bindings without re-running policy.
- Signed-envelope authentication (Native and npm) additionally checks the consumer's trust policy and any pinned context. Both surfaces use the same Rust core and emit the same canonical report — and neither re-runs policy.
- Native
vouch verify --reexecuteemitscsk.native-reexecution-report/v0. It reports authentication first, then the current Native execution under the fixed complete-transcript scope, then the current-versus-signed comparison. - Native
vouch gate --require-decisionemits the unsigned diagnosticcsk.native-gate-report/v0. The report records whether a live grant was minted, but it is never itself a capability and is never accepted as gate input. vouch compiled build|inspect|validatehandleslispex.vouch-compiled-artifact/v1. The container binds exact source identities, Core IR, and verified bytecode. It is integrity material, not signed evidence.- Opt-in compiled re-execution emits
csk.native-compiled-reexecution-report/v1; the compiled gate emitscsk.native-compiled-gate-report/v1. Both are deterministic diagnostic output and cannot recreate the live typed evidence or grant they describe. - Replay compares an explicit corpus and records agree, mismatch, and not-comparable outcomes.
- Bridge reports use their own type tags and required fields, disjoint from every receipt tag and field above.
Why a saved file cannot become authority
Live authority in Vouch moves through one fixed chain: authenticated evidence, then request-bound authenticated evidence, then re-executed evidence, then a local grant. Each step of that chain is constructed privately inside the running Native process. No serialized v0 report, bundle, receipt, Bridge value, authentication-only evidence, or caller-supplied byte buffer can skip a transition or recreate one after the fact.
The same rule covers source images. PNG/ZIP bytes and their inspection JSON are source transport and integrity data, not signed Vouch evidence. The unchanged envelope signs the unchanged receipt context; neither an image, a bundle, a report, a Bridge value, nor a decoded byte buffer can recreate live request-bound evidence.
Receipt field groups
| Group | Binds or records | Does not establish |
|---|---|---|
| trust policy v1 source allowlist | consumer approval of the authenticated receipt source identity for the selected key | a new receipt claim, normalized-source approval, input approval, promotion of a report into evidence, or transferable authority |
| input bundle | exact untrusted envelope/source/input bytes supplied to the existing verifier | receipt status, signature authority, trust, promotion of a report into evidence, freshness, replay prevention, or source approval |
| contract/type | csk.differential-receipt/v0 and schema version | future-schema compatibility |
| source/input | exact checked rule and pinned datum bytes/hashes | correctness or completeness of host data conversion |
| execution | lowering/evaluation transcript and observed result | semantic equivalence outside the checked profile |
| identity | declared generator/version and artifact hashes | authenticity, issuer identity, or timestamp truth |
| verification | schema and recomputable byte bindings | honest generation or policy correctness |
| authentication (Native/npm) | authorized signature plus exact source, input, profile, and issuer-engine context; the same Rust core yields byte-identical v0 reports | historical execution, freshness, identity, honest deployment, or implementation independence |
| compiled artifact | canonical exact-source identities, Core IR identity, verified bytecode bytes and identity, fixed profile, verifier, VM, and limits | signature, trust, request choice, execution, compiler correctness outside exact re-derivation, or authority |
| native re-execution | both current Native evaluators agree and their complete canonical transcript equals both signed observations | independent witnessing, authorization, policy correctness, or whole-language equivalence |
| compiled native re-execution | request-bound authentication and current tree/Meaning agreement remain valid; the artifact exactly re-derives from that source and the verified current Rust VM matches the same signed transcript | independent implementation equivalence, freshness, replay prevention, organizational identity, source or policy correctness, or external-action authority |
| general Topaz VM request, result, or comparison | what the exact installed non-Vouch engine observed for exact verified bytecode, with product lineage and zero fallback | authentication, compiled Vouch agreement, evidence, grant, independent equivalence proof, or external-action authority |
| Topaz AOT product, source map, artifact, executable, inspection, validation, or run result | exact generated and installed execution material plus bounded local observations and zero fallback | entry into Vouch, authentication, request-bound re-execution evidence, gate grant, publisher identity, or equivalence proof |
| four-route comparison receipt | one exact source/input/Core IR/bytecode request, four explicit route observations, semantic and comparable-resource mismatch axes, lineage, and zero-fallback state | authentication, a new implementation family, whole-profile proof, compiled Vouch evidence, a gate grant, or permission for an external action |
| local decision gate | live re-executed evidence exactly matches one required decision in the current Native invocation | transferable authority, freshness, replay prevention, identity, deployment safety, or permission for an external action |
| compiled local gate | live compiled re-executed evidence matches one required decision with basis csk.current-native-compiled-agreement/v1 | a reusable capability; the serialized report cannot be submitted as evidence or permission |
A common mistake
Hashes establish byte binding and internal consistency, not authenticity or honest generation. Re-execution agreement does not establish freshness, historical execution, independent witnessing, policy correctness, or whole-language equivalence.
The Topaz VM transport is intentionally disjoint from every step that creates
live Vouch evidence. A Topaz request/result, provider manifest, executable
hash, observation, or compare-vms receipt cannot replace the dedicated
source-derived compiled artifact or the current Rust VM step. The same
disjointness covers every AOT manifest, source map, executable,
compare-routes receipt, and report: bytes you can inspect or run never
become a live typed capability.
Keep going
Keep the Vouch overview nearby: it separates authentication, request binding, current execution agreement, and a local grant.